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In the 1920s, while Martin Heidegger was working against a then dominant strain of 
neo-Kantian intellectualism to provide the grounding ontology of Dasein as being-
in-the-world, Soviet developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky was reorienting psy-
chology away from the reductivism that occupied the high court of the post-revolu-
tionary Russian academy. Vygotsky prioritized human consciousness, or the “higher 
mental functions” (e.g., semantic memory, propositional cognition, numeracy, and 
literacy), as the main explanandum of psychological science. Allying himself with 
a Marxian dialectical method, he developed a “cultural-historical” explanation of 
how higher cognitive functions are achieved and enacted by the transformation of 
more basic mental capacities through social and artifactual (i.e., semiotic) media-
tion. The dawning of a meaningful world, and indeed the “cultural-historical sub-
ject,” was thus for Vygotsky the emergent outcome of diachronically entrenched cul-
tural practices, norms, and institutions, as well as synchronically enacted social and 
communicative practices—in short, of mediated activity, in ontogenetic, historical, 
and phylogenetic registers. While it may be the case that in Heidegger’s “existential 
analytic” the breakdown of the tool discloses to Dasein a larger world of social-
practical significance, such an occurrence does little to explain how Dasein becomes 
acquainted with a such a world in the first place. The development of Dasein, then, 
is something Heidegger seems to take for granted—his account providing a phenom-
enology only of the “dealings” of a mature subject, one for whom the appropriative 
aspect of inter-social activity in ontogenesis has long since passed (not that it is ever 
fully completed). Vygotsky’s project can be viewed in sharp relief to Heidegger’s 
insofar as the former attempts to explain how the objective world of significance 
initially comes to mean anything at all.
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Lawrence J. Hatab’s Proto-Phenomenology, Language Acquisition, Orality and 
Literacy: Dwelling in Speech II aims to provide a (“proto-”) phenomenology of lan-
guage acquisition and becoming-literate at both ontogenetic and cultural-historical 
scales of analysis. This places his project at the intersection of Heideggerian phe-
nomenology and Vygotskian developmental psychology. Indeed, Hatab at times is 
explicitly committed to the Vygotskian position of sociogenetic development, which 
explains that cognitive development proceeds according to an “outside-to-inside” 
model. Further, he maintains this position with a phenomenological attentiveness to 
certain pre-reflective modes of being-in-the-world.
According to Vygotsky, higher mental functions are the products of the “inter-
nalization” of social-practical activity. For instance, Vygotsky describes how indexi-
cal gestures scaffold the development of semanticity in infant-parent exchanges 
(Vygotsky, 1997a). Initially, a child may simply reach for a desired object. But after 
parental intervention, the reach takes on a semantic dimension as an act of pointing, 
eventually coming to mean “I want that.” For Vygotsky, such semiotic interaction 
begets a functional transformation [vrashchivanie, revolution] of the child’s cogni-
tive capacities (Vygotsky, 1999, 53). The introduction of symbolic forms of com-
munication into the field of activity does not merely augment or enhance the child’s 
cognitive apparatus, but fundamentally transforms it to something uniquely human 
(ibid., 36). This notion of transformation, as something other than enhancement, is 
essential to Vygotsky’s project and I will return to it later. For now, we can note that 
Hatab’s goal in this work is to add to Heideggerian ontology a much-needed devel-
opmental dimension, one that renders explicit how it is that an individual comes to 
find herself dwelling in a meaningful world.
The first volume of Dwelling in Speech (2017) finds Hatab alongside Heidegger’s 
existential analytic in Division I of Being and Time. There he concentrates on “eve-
ryday embeddedness in meaningful practices and experiences” (Hatab, 2019, xi) and 
engages with questions of meaning, knowledge, self, and society as they pertain to 
the lived—and linguistically constituted—world of practically and socially embedded 
individuals. Hatab employs a “proto-phenomenological” methodology to account for 
the world of average-everyday existence as it appears prior to (hence “proto-”) any 
decontextualized understandings that must rely on intentionalistic analyses of sub-
ject-object relations. In Volume II, Hatab continues such proto-phenomenology while 
marshaling an impressive assortment of research in his service, including not only 
that explicitly associated with Vygotsky’s sociogenetic approach, but also 4E cogni-
tion, the media ecology of the Toronto School, the literacy studies of Walter Ong 
and David R. Olson, and an impressive array of empirical studies in linguistics and 
psychology. To this effect, Hatab’s object is not only the world-building character of 
language, but also the specific effects of literacy for both children and entire cultures.
The book can roughly be divided into two complimentary investigations: the 
first explores the ontogenetic development of language, the second the cultural-his-
torical development of literacy, though there is some overlap in these dimensions 
when describing literacy’s ontogenetic effects. As such, Chapter  2 deals with the 
child’s preverbal world, while Chapter 3 addresses language acquisition. Chapter 4 
describes the transition from orality to literacy in ontogenetic as well as cultural-his-
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The last chapter examines the effects of orthographic culture throughout its develop-
ment in the Western world.
Readers familiar with Hatab’s earlier book are encouraged to begin with the sec-
ond chapter. For the uninitiated, Chapter 1 summarizes the first volume of this work. 
Here Hatab renders Heidegger’s “hermeneutics of facticity” in a clear and straight-
forward manner, developing a unique vocabulary of “indicative concepts” to per-
formatively reveal what is already implicit in the world of lived factical experience. 
Taken on its own, this chapter can be a helpful resource to students of Division I of 
Being and Time and early Heidegger in general.
Chapter  2 constructs a phenomenology of pre-linguistic childhood experience 
(and by extension, pre-reflective consciousness). Hatab bypasses the traditional 
methodological problems entailed in taking “fringe minds”—the contents of which 
are inaccessible to first person experience and incapable of being conceptually 
relayed by the preverbal children in question—as an object of study (Sleutels, 2013). 
He eschews simply expanding the domain of folk psychological concepts to include 
children (thereby avoiding the intellectualism that the Heideggerian protests) while 
also taking care not to embrace any type of eliminative materialism, and does so 
without relying on any biologically determinative “preformationist” and/or “matura-
tion” theories of development. Hatab’s platform here is in essence an application 
of the main methodological assumptions of cultural-historical psychology, resisting 
not only (1) mentalism and dualism, but also (2) any reflexology or behaviorism 
that relegates cognition to a mechanistic “data input” and “action output” model 
(Leontiev, 2009), as well as (3) an ahistorical biologism which takes development 
to proceed according to timeless “natural” dictates (Vygotsky, 1997b, 279 & 1999, 
3). Heidegger of course was suspicious of the very same models (Heidegger, 1995, 
2010), but he avoided the question of development. Hatab corrects this, providing a 
phenomenological interpretation of Vygotskian ontogeny, where individual develop-
ment is a product/process of social-semiotic internalization. Engaging with topics 
such as imitation, joint-attention, and co-affective engagement, this chapter incorpo-
rates material that would be familiar to readers of this journal and those invested in 
4E cognition and developmental psychology.
Chapter  3 explains language acquisition in neither fully nativistic nor behav-
ioristic terms. Splitting the difference between the nature-culture dichotomy, 
Hatab admits that “indigenous pre-linguistic capacities … prepare and make pos-
sible language development” while also holding that such capacities “presuppose 
embodied, perceptual, practical, and social aptitudes—which early on display the 
‘field’ character of the lived world” (Hatab, 2019, 104). The discussion is moti-
vated by Hatab’s commitment to providing an alternative to representation-cen-
tric accounts of language, and it seems that he would well agree with Stephen 
Cowley’s dictum that “phylogenetically, ontogenetically and neurally, language 
is dynamic first, symbolic second” (2008, 500). Hatab accordingly focuses on the 
linguistically constitutive nature of “world-disclosure” and the collaborative struc-
ture of the “personal-social-world” that occasions such disclosure. Enactivist read-
ers and those engaged in the projects of distributed and extended cognition (e.g., 
Clark, 2006a; DiPaolo et al. 2018; Hutchins & Johnson, 2009) will find Hatab’s 
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of Vygotsky as well: initially, children’s language-use is unreflective and exter-
nally directed, amidst “affective-conative” inter-social activity (Vygotsky, 2012, 
68–9). Such activity acts as “scaffolding” so that socially directed utterances may 
become self-directed utterances, which themselves scaffold the development of 
more complex practical competencies. This eventually gives rise to inner-speech, 
which itself serves to scaffold higher forms of conceptual/propositional cognition. 
But while Hatab makes frequent mention of Vygotsky’s developmental story, his 
discussion would have benefited from a more sustained engagement with the lit-
erature of “cognitive artifacts” and spatially distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995; 
Kirsh, 1995; Norman, 1991).
One of the central concerns of the book is the development and constitution of a 
meaningful world. This could be more comprehensively addressed with an approach 
contoured to semiotic mediation in general, including in its analyses the meaning-
ful structures of non-linguistic objects and/or communicative vehicles that resist a 
symbolic taxonomical status. Consider, e.g., Hutchins’ (2005, 2014) account of con-
ceptual “blending,” which exemplifies the basic process of attaching meaning and 
responding to actionable cues in a given material array. The idea of a movie theater, 
e.g., sets a background for perceiving and conceptualizing a place in which peo-
ple “line up” for tickets. Obviously cultural context is important here. But there is 
also a spatial-material basis, or “anchor,” for such conceptualization. A conceptual 
structure—in this case a “trajector” (Langacker, 1987)—is mapped onto the mate-
rial constituents of the line (individuals linearly arranged in a certain space), and 
“this mapping of imagined structure onto perceived structure produces a conceptual 
blend which gives rise to a particularly emergent property: a sequential ordering of 
the bodies of the individuals in the queue” (Hutchins, 2014, 39). The conceptual 
blending of the line and trajector is cognitively prescriptive insofar as it “makes pos-
sible a set of inferences” regarding how one must go about getting a ticket (by wait-
ing until it is your turn) and when that might happen (by perceiving the amount 
of people ahead of you) (loc. cit.). In a sense, then, material and spatial anchors 
and the conceptual blends they produce can functionally amount to something 
like “ephemerally emergent artifacts.” And like Norman’s “cognitive artifacts,” such 
would cue and constrain cognition, leading to both the expansion of the functional 
capacity of the individual as well as altering or replacing the actions and operations 
in the activity itself (Norman, 1991, 22). There are many thick philosophical issues 
to work through in the domain of semiotic mediation, many of which would find 
resonance with Heideggerian phenomenology—e.g., the semiotics of artifacts and 
“equipment” as well as the nature of nonartifactual functionality and signification 
(Sinha, 1988, 2015), the phenomenology of indexical gesturing (Thao, 1986), and 
so-called “enactive” signification (Malafouris, 2013). Hatab takes some steps in this 
direction, especially in the next chapter, as his discussion of numeracy demonstrates 
(and numbers are cognitive artifacts par excellence). But on the whole, he avoids 
such excursions in favor of a more generalist presentation of the child’s life-world in 
development.
Chapter 4 addresses writing and literacy both in terms of their ontogenetic devel-
opment and their cultural emergence in ancient Greece. Hatab begins by looking 
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orality to writing transforms the very manner in which spoken language is under-
stood and experienced (Hatab, 2019, 159). Indeed, one of the larger tasks of this 
chapter is to illustrate how orthographic comprehension introduces the possibility 
of decontextualized reflective thinking. Classical philosophical problems such as 
adequation in perception and reference in semantics, Hatab argues, are reifications 
made possible by the graphic presentation of language insofar as it severs an indi-
vidual from her immediate factical concerns. There is indeed an element of truth 
to such a prospect, and Hatab is correct in claiming that writing and literacy have 
traditionally been downplayed in philosophy and linguistics. But his framing of 
the discussion occludes the opportunity to deal with more primary forms of non-
linguistic decontextualization. In Soviet philosophy, for instance, productive activ-
ity and exchange processes are responsible for the generation of propositional cog-
nition, or “ideal forms of reflection” (Ilyenkov, 1977; Leontiev, 1977). And it has 
been suggested elsewhere that, in ontogenesis, a normative understanding of an arti-
fact comes prior and possibly as a precursor to language acquisition insofar as its 
socially imposed semiotic status may “override” the more primary and affordance-
based activity of an infant (Sinha & Rodriguez, 2007). Here is a ready site in which 
to phenomenologically explore the genesis of decontextualization and the primary 
apprehension of social-practical norms, the latter which surely constitute elements 
in and of “worlding.”
The fifth chapter looks at literacy and the development of philosophy in ancient 
Greece, while Chapter  6 describes the cultural effects of technologies of literacy, 
up to and including the development of printing. Both chapters describe the cogni-
tive gains of being-literate, while also highlighting how the explicative and abstract 
modes of thinking that accompany orthographic competence result in the distancing 
of more primary and phenomenologically immersive experience. The arc of the dis-
cussion will be familiar to readers of Havelock, Ong and Olson, and Hatab excels in 
performing a critical history of the subject. However, there is something odd in the 
way these final chapters risk disturbing the presentational balance of the text as a 
whole. Where the first part of this work justified its phenomenological method inso-
far as it convincingly dealt with the genesis of a particularly historical and materially 
contingent type of subjectivity, the Heideggerian appeals in its latter half to a pre-
Cartesian phusis and the “sacred disclosures” of the ancient Greek world betray a 
Romantic fixation on a disenchantment motif that is hard to defend, especially when 
one considers the research of certain new-materialists (Bennett, 2001; Turkle, 2011) 
and material engagement theorists (Malafouris, 2008, Malafouris & Renfrew, 2010) 
that analyzes the semiotic and affective capabilities of material objects and artifacts 
to make a case for just how “enchanted” contemporary life can actually be.1 Over-
all, despite some keen references (Hatab, 2019, 267n108), the semiotic and affec-
tive import of non-documental materiality falls outside the purview of this work. 
This is not to say that Hatab’s focus on literacy prevents him from occasionally dis-
cussing nonlinguistic cognitive artifacts (e.g., maps and mathematical notations). In 
these instances, however, Hatab does not seem to distinguish between literacy and 
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graphism in general, and one is left wanting a clearer explanation of the latter’s pre-
cise role in development.
But there is a bigger over-arching problem in the second half of Hatab’s book, 
which returns us to our opening theme of “transformation.” Chapter 4 has Hatab at 
his closest alignment with extended mind theory (EMT). By the end of that chap-
ter, the author grants that writing is itself an extended cognitive process: “literacy 
has a scaffolding effect on expanding human cognition beyond immediate descrip-
tions, conversations, recollections, and anticipations. Whether in rudimentary or 
refined forms, the labor of writing is itself a process of thinking and not simply an 
expression of thoughts” (Hatab, 2019, 174). But this focus on writing as expand-
ing obscures an important difference between certain 4E applications of Vygotskian 
psychology and Vygotsky’s own claims. Andy Clark, for instance, has long held that 
the cognitive role of language systems, or more broadly of “material symbols,” is 
more than simply the transmission of content to be realized in a recipient’s inner 
neural code. Rather, material symbols make an ongoing contribution to cognition as 
coupled resources which “complement the basic modes of operation and representa-
tion endemic to the biological brain” (Clark, 2006b, 293). Yet while still opposing 
strictly internalist accounts of language processing, Clark nonetheless diverges from 
a transformationalist view that posits that the development of higher mental func-
tions consists in the functional-structural reorganization of neuronal systems (Clark, 
1997; see also Wheeler, 2004). Clark, in essence, theorizes the written word as 
enhancing rather than transforming. Indeed, early iterations of EMT are concerned 
with the metaphysical task of expanding the boundaries of the mind beyond tradi-
tional internalist and individualist frameworks. Thus, at stake for Clark is not the 
functional transformation of a cognitive capacity but rather the functionality of a 
cognitive resource itself, insofar as that resource may come to realize the vehicle of 
a particular cognitive state. For Vygotsky, the inward effect of mediation is always 
something more than the mere enhancement of cognitive hardware; lower men-
tal functions undergo, as Vygotsky says, a radical reconstruction. In ontogenesis, 
even perceptual and motor systems are transformed after habituated engagements 
with signs and other cultural-psychological tools (Vygotsky, 1999, 31). Dennett 
more recently defends this view that nonliterate minds involve significantly differ-
ent representational capacities than those of literate minds (1991, 218–221 & 1998, 
291–292; see also Olson, 2016). Ultimately, such differences come to bear on the 
types of the collective social structures—and indeed “worlds”—available to such 
minded people.
Hatab finds himself stuck between taking a side on this issue, claiming at once 
that the artificial character of material signs can “be understood as transformative of 
human nature, especially when reading and writing become second nature and trans-
missive of wider horizons, both internal and external” (Hatab, 2019, 266), while 
noting in the same paragraph that such transformation is not really a transformation, 
“but simply an amplification of human possibilities” (loc. cit.). Hatab seems to not 
want to say that literate and nonliterate societies (and the world disclosures therein) 
are different in kind, and he reminds the reader that nonliterate societies should in no 
way be thought of as inferior to literate. This egalitarian urge is understandable, but 
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debated in the early twentieth century. Lévy-Bruhl (1985), for instance, defended 
“primitive” mentality from charges of inferiority that were common in the writ-
ings of early anthropologists like Frazer and Tylor. Where the latter championed 
the Eurocentric and chauvinistic view that “primitive thinking differs only in degree 
from modern: primitives think less rigorously than moderns” (Segal, 1987, 355), 
Lévy-Bruhl held that primitive minds function just as intensely as our own, and only 
differ in their representational constraints. In Vygotsky’s application of Lévy-Bruhl, 
this means that primitive minds are simply ones that have not undergone a literate 
transformation (Vygotsky & Luria, 2016). The difference between literate and non-
literate minds is thus not one of degree at all—they are fundamentally different in 
kind, and construct and dwell in qualitatively different worlds. Ironically, to cast lit-
eracy as an enhancement (or “amplification”) is to quantitatively reify a literate/non-
literate hierarchy, as though the nonliterate is simply not as enhanced as the literate.
Avoiding a strong stance on the issue of transformation perhaps illustrates a 
deeper rift between a transhumanist outlook and Heideggerian phenomenology 
writ large. The ultimate aim of Vygotsky’s psychology was to have some bear-
ing on what the human may become. For Vygotsky, semiotic mediation serves not 
only in the deployment or even enhancement of certain cognitive states, but also 
takes on a fundamentally generative role in their development. Who Dasein is is 
always subject to transformation. Proto-phenomenology purports to behold such 
transformation not just at the level of average-everyday facticity, but at Dasein’s 
developmental crux. It might be time to more fully embrace the radicality of such 
a project.
Dwelling in Speech II is part of the Rowman & Littlefield “New Heidegger 
Research” series. For Heideggerians new to 4E cognition, developmental psychol-
ogy, and literacy studies, this book could be an effective entry into a burgeoning 
interdisciplinary field. And those already invested in such projects may find inspira-
tion in Hatab’s general orientation and the scope of his project. Employing a phe-
nomenological method while pairing ontogenetic and cultural-historical analyses of 
human development is a grand task, and we should welcome the attempt.
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